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ABSTRACT
Information security has been an area of research and teaching
within various computing disciplines in higher education almost
since the beginnings of modern computers. The need for security in
computing curricula has steadily grown over this period. Recently,
with an emerging global crisis, because of the limitations of secu-
rity within the nascent information technology infrastructure, the
field of “cybersecurity” is emerging with international interest and
support. Recent evolution of cybersecurity shows that it has begun
to take shape as a true academic perspective, as opposed to simply
being a training domain for certain specialized jobs. This report
starts from the premise that cybersecurity is a “meta-discipline.”
That is, cybersecurity is used as an aggregate label for a wide va-
riety of similar disciplines, much in the same way that the terms
“engineering” and “computing” are commonly used. Thus, cyberse-
curity should be formally interpreted as a meta-discipline with a
variety of disciplinary variants, also characterized through a generic
competency model. The intention is that this simple organizational
concept will improve the clarity with which the field matures, re-
sulting in improved standards and goals for many different types
of cybersecurity programs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Unfilled cybersecurity positions will number around 3.5 million
across the world by 2021 [55]. As a result, many “alternative educa-
tion” programs have been created, which include certification-based
courses, online courses, and other non-traditional approaches to
training and education. Some of these programs have been used as
alternatives to college, and many high school computing and cyber-
security programs are designed to support career paths that do not
involve traditional college attendance. By short-circuiting college,
training programs quickly ramp up the size of the cybersecurity
workforce, but lack themany benefits of a traditional undergraduate
college education [58].
Universities are increasing their offerings at the undergradu-
ate level to develop a qualified cybersecurity workforce in several
ways. First, traditional computing programs, such as computer sci-
ence, are incorporating security content, as illustrated by various
model curricula documents [6–8, 43], as well as by recent work
by ABET [3], the predominant accreditation body for programs in
computing, engineering, engineering technology, and applied and
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Figure 1: Towards Cybersecurity as a Meta-Discipline
natural science in the United States. In their latest accreditation cri-
teria, ABET now requires coverage of some cybersecurity principles
in all undergraduate computing programs. ABET has also created
new criteria for cybersecurity and for engineering programs.
Additionally, universities are now offering standalone cyberse-
curity programs, most often as continuing education in the context
of executive education or certificate programs, and sometimes as
professional master’s programs. They have also begun to offer stan-
dalone undergraduate cybersecurity programs of a more traditional
format. ABET has recently produced accreditation criteria for under-
graduate degree programs in cybersecurity, which will complement
existing accreditation criteria for programs in computer science,
information systems and information technology.
The above categories of programs are present in universities
around the world. While existing academic disciplines evolve to
incorporate cybersecurity content, separate degree programs are
likely to continue well into the future. How should cybersecurity
degrees coexist alongside other degree programs within the mod-
ern university? Several different variants of cybersecurity currently
exist, for instance, in criminal justice, computer science, informa-
tion technology or software engineering, while others are included
within various degrees in business, law and the various social sci-
ences. Any reasonable cybersecurity education framework thus
needs to allow for a wide variation of types of cybersecurity de-
grees.
Any framework that promotes stability and growth needs to
have a unifying basis and be accompanied by a well-understood
set of terms and concepts. One definition of cybersecurity is: "a
computing-based discipline involving technology, people, informa-
tion, and processes to enable assured operations in the context of
adversaries. It involves the creation, operation, analysis, and testing
of secure computer systems. It is an interdisciplinary course of
study, including aspects of law, policy, human factors, ethics, and
risk management" [30].
The unifying basis for cybersecurity is that it focuses on the
“adversarial aspects” of computing, i.e., to study the prevention and
detection of threats and the response to attacks. The maturation of
the cybersecurity discipline is essential for ensuring that the digital
transformation of society becomes sustainable in the long term.
This paper proposes that the term “cybersecurity” be used with
the specific intent of referring to a broad “meta-discipline” cover-
ing a broad spectrum of disciplinary variants, with corresponding
bachelor-level programs, as illustrated in Figure 1. It is necessary to
understand and manage the adversarial aspects of computing, and
to respond to the need for enforcing laws and policies in cyberspace.
Just as Louis Fein’s seminal paper in 1959 [23] proposed “com-
puter sciences” as a discipline and as a university organizational
unit, a similar proposal and rationale is needed for a terminologi-
cal and organizational framework for cybersecurity. The proposal
of the ‘computer sciences’ as a disciplinary area was followed by
the formation of numerous computer science programs within the
1960s, which was a period of major technological demand. With a
unified basis and terminological conceptualization of cybersecurity,
more institutions are likely to formalize and accredit their fledgling,
ad hoc programs in this space.
Similarly, degree programs in cybersecurity can be blended from
concepts across a wide spectrum of disciplines, and depending on
the area of emphasis, several substantially different degree pro-
grams could take on the “cybersecurity” title or other similarly
generic name. Due to the ambiguity associated with the current
use of program and degree names, it is useful to distinguish the
notion of “big-cybersecurity” from the various individual cyberse-
curity disciplines. Here, big-cybersecurity is a meta-discipline, or
the really broad concept that encompasses several more specific
disciplines, much like the way engineering, mathematics, or science
are broad meta-disciplines that are made up of many different spe-
cific disciplines. The suggestion therefore is that the individual
cybersecurity disciplines – termed as “small-cybersecurity” – need
different names that directly describe their areas of emphases, e.g.,
network security, cyber criminology, or secure software develop-
ment. Disciplines including political science, law, liberal arts and
psychology have an impact on different “small-cybersecurity” dis-
ciplines. For example, Dawson and Thomson discuss the impact of
skills beyond just technical that will have an impact on the future
cybersecurity workforce [18].
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This report proposes a consistent terminological framework
around a vision for cybersecurity education. As such, it clarifies
the scope of what is included in a cybersecurity degree and what is
part of the field of study in at least two ways by discussing:
(1) The emergence of the various types of cybersecurity degrees,
and
(2) The collection of learning competencies that define a bound-
ary around cybersecurity as a descriptor of degree programs.
The remainder of the report is organized as follows. Section 2
is a review of previous efforts to characterize cybersecurity as a
discipline. Section 3 is a review of currently active efforts in this
area, and Section 4 is a conceptual framework for the future that is
organized around the idea of cybersecurity as a family of academic
disciplines.
2 PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS OF GLOBAL
CYBERSECURITY EDUCATION
This section summarizes prior efforts in global cybersecurity edu-
cation, based heavily on three ITiCSE working group reports. The
first of these reports explored the state of cybersecurity educa-
tion in 2009 [17]; the second outlined draft curricular guidelines
in 2010 [16]; and the third examined cybersecurity education in
institutions offering two- and four-year degrees in 2011 [45]. Note
that these earlier reports are written in terms of “information as-
surance," the term commonly used for cybersecurity in that time
period.
These three past ITiCSE reports capture the history of cyberse-
curity education, and as a core set of members participated in each
of the three working groups, the reports follow similar formats
and provide a three-year sequence, starting with “exploration” to
“curricula guidelines” to “information assurance education.”
2.1 The ITiCSE 2009 Working Group Report
The 2009 ITiCSE working group explored “the space of various
existing information assurance educational standards and guide-
lines, and how they may serve as a basis for helping to define the
field of information assurance” [17]. The group studied the position
of security in other areas of computing, for example, computer
science within the CS 2008 guidelines [15] and information technol-
ogy within IT 2008 [33]. Given that few undergraduate computing
faculty members in the early 2000s focused on cybersecurity edu-
cation, the 2009 report treated cybersecurity education as a global
issue rather than limited to a single country. Broader curricular
recommendations had been made to include security in computer
engineering (CE2004), software engineering (SE2004), computer
science (CS2008), and information technology (IT2008), discussed
in more detail in Section 3.3.
The 2009 report examined the growth of cybersecurity educa-
tion and training starting in the 1970s when industrial conferences
began to provide continuing education courses in cybersecurity
topics such as audit and security management, with commercial
training programs such as SANS, ISC2, and ISACA came into ex-
istence. Additionally, college faculty began to develop and teach
coursework on computer security, with full courses emerging by
the early 1980s, specific information security journals dedicated to
academic research papers emerged. Significant changes occurred
in 1987 when the National Computer Security Center (NCSC), of
the US National Security Agency (NSA) brought together subject
matter experts from government, academia and industry to develop
six undergraduate curriculum modules for use by computer science
professors [17]. This was the first effort by the US government
with an objective to promote and coordinate computer security
education. The Cooper et al. report [17] also traces the history of
cybersecurity, starting with several efforts of the US governmental
agencies and continuing with professional societies such as the
International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) working
group WG 11.8, ACM, IEEE, the British Computer Society, and the
Australian Computer Society. In 1998, the Centers of Academic Ex-
cellence (CAE) [30] in Information Assurance Education (IAE), later
renamed Cyber Defense, recognized institutions with significant
cybersecurity education programs and encouraged other institu-
tions to develop such offerings. The report also identified the role
of government standards and guidelines that helped to improve
the quality of Information Assurance (IA) education in the US and
other Western countries. For instance, ISO 17024:2003 certified US
organizations for use by the US Department of Defense, and the de-
velopment of the 1998 NIST Special Publication 800-16 as a “living
handbook” for training for federal agencies.
A variety of industry-based and vendor-specific IA training and
certification programs also developed to provide necessary training
for personnel in the workforce. Two categories of vendor train-
ing and certifications are those that are vendor-specific and those
that are vendor-neutral. Vendor-specific IA training addresses spe-
cific products and services, whereas vendor-neutral IA training
addresses the general IA knowledge areas necessary for a given
occupation, e.g., system administrator or systems security certified
practitioner. The primary stakeholders in industry-based training
were the leads/heads of companies and organizations who were
responsible for the success of their organizations, and needed to
consider a balance between training and education for their em-
ployees and also manage the training costs.
The report also focused on one of the greatest challenges asso-
ciated with education and training, that is, to determine a success
metric that relates to the actual learning that has taken place.
2.2 The ITiCSE 2010 Working Group Report
The 2010 report [16] built on the 2009 report and focused on ex-
isting cybersecurity curricula, as well as key government- and
industry-oriented cybersecurity education standards and guide-
lines. By 2010, cybersecurity (then called information assurance)
was already viewed as a set of technical and managerial controls de-
signed to ensure the confidentiality, possession of control, integrity,
authenticity, availability, and utility of information and information
systems. It included measures that protect and defend information
and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity,
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.
The 2010 working group took the first steps toward defining
educational models for cybersecurity by addressing two specific
problems: (a) identification of topics that comprehensively defined
cybersecurity, independent of degree program and specific aca-
demic discipline, and (b) development of a set of topics and as-
sociated student learning outcomes for one cybersecurity subject
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to serve as a model for future efforts to define other subjects. To
create a Cybersecurity Body of Knowledge (BoK), they distributed
an electronic survey to all existing US CAE [57] institutions. The
survey was a tool to synthesize varied curricular content of these
cybersecurity programs into a single comprehensive set of topic
areas to define the space of cybersecurity education. The work-
ing group received 33 responses of which 29 were usable for data
analysis. The questions included typical demographics as well as
two additional questions related to (a) the actual percentage of a
course of study covering each of a given set of major topic areas,
and (b) the percentage of the course of study that should cover each
of these major topic areas. The major topic areas identified were
fundamental aspects: cryptography, ethics, policy, digital forensics,
access controls, security architecture, network security, risk man-
agement, attacks/defenses, operational issues, and secure software
design and engineering. The topics listed were sufficient to cover
the field.
The working group used the survey findings to help define an
all-encompassing cybersecurity BoK. The working group resolved
the BoK into 11 major areas and related subjects. In particular,
the group concluded that both theory and practice were defining
characteristics of cybersecurity education, and that the compelling
distinguishing feature of cybersecurity, as compared to other disci-
plines, is the presence of opposing actors or adversaries.
For each of the 11 cybersecurity subject areas, the report also
identified the topics and learning outcomes associated with that
subject. The purpose was to develop a template for all eleven areas
described above. Key principles, common issues, learning outcomes
at different Bloom’s levels and assessment rubrics were included
for each topic. The specific subject chosen for detailed exploration
was secure coding.
In short, the working group proposed 11 areas that constitute
cybersecurity education, with 83 associated subjects. The in-depth
coverage of secure coding was set up as a model for descriptions of
the other 82 subjects. The group also called for bodies such as ACM
to develop and own these curricular guidelines for cybersecurity.
2.3 The ITiCSE 2011 Working Group Report
The 2011 report [45] examined a broad set of undergraduate cyber-
security two- and four-year programs at college levels. Within the
US, the group focused on the challenge of articulation between two-
and four-year programs; articulation refers to agreements between
two-year and four-year programs to allow for smoother transfer
of students. The group also looked at cybersecurity programs at
international institutions to gain insight into differences between
US and non-US cybersecurity programs. Across the board in 2011,
as at present, the group noted that consensus about what consti-
tutes cybersecurity education had not been reached, which resulted
in bachelor degrees in cybersecurity or related disciplines with
widely varying curricula. For US institutions only, the NSA/DHS
CAE (for four-year undergraduate, as well as graduate programs)
and CAE2Y (for two-year programs) guidance [57] provides some
curricular guidance, but not to constrain the breadth and depth of
cybersecurity degree programs.
Within the US, community colleges (which offer two-year pro-
grams) play a major role in the education of cybersecurity techni-
cians, practitioners and professionals. However, the lack of curricu-
lar guidance and standards, as well as program establishment and
sustainability, were major challenges. Common two-year cybersecu-
rity degrees included both the associate of science (AS) degree and
the associate of applied science (AAS) degree; students graduating
with the former often intend to transfer to four-year undergraduate
programs while the latter traditionally prepares students to enter
the workforce immediately upon graduation. The working group
examined the content, context and purpose of 16 associate-degree
programs in cybersecurity. Of the approximate 1200 community
colleges nationwide, only 13 had received the CAE2Y designation
by 2011. Industry-based certifications in AAS degree programs pro-
vided an easier path to employment and standardized assessment
of prior learning, but made articulation into four-year programs
harder, as the skill-based training did not provide educational con-
cepts needed for long-term career growth.
In 2011, most US cybersecurity programs were at the graduate
level, but a few full-fledged four-year undergraduate cybersecurity
programs were emerging, despite the lack of clarity about what
exactly constituted such a program. The working group identified
73 CAE institutions offering bachelor degrees with cybersecurity
concentrations or minors. Of these, 42 were housed in computer
science, 16 within computer information systems, six are in secu-
rity departments, five in information technology, four in housed in
informatics, three in electrical and computer engineering depart-
ments, one in software engineering, and one in criminal justice.
The four-year cybersecurity degree programs had names such as
information security and assurance (1), cybersecurity (2), infor-
mation assurance and forensics (2), information technology (1),
infrastructure assurance (1), computer science - security track (1),
and computer and network security (1). Other than covering net-
work security, introductory security concepts and ethics, it was
hard to discern any other commonalities across the nine programs.
The working group considered cybersecurity education at insti-
tutions outside the US, where the term “information assurance” is
not typically used. Looking at bachelor-level computing security
programs, the group compared bachelor-level computing security
programs at seven non-US institutions using the list of eleven IA
subjects suggested by the 2010 ITiCSE working group (see above),
augmented with four additional subjects to reflect non-US pro-
grams’ needs: fundamental aspects, cryptography, ethics, policy,
digital forensics, access control, security architecture, network secu-
rity, risk management, attacks/defenses, operational issues, secure
software design and engineering, computer science, soft skills, prac-
tice, project, thesis, and other optional areas. The working group
found many similarities among the security programs in course-
work on software development, networks, database systems, and
operating systems. The programs also had significant differences
in terms of the quantity and depth of security-related topics, or the
program objectives (preparation for workforce or advanced study).
The bachelor’s programs within and outside the US thus revealed
commonalities and differences. Degree programs in fields, such as
computer engineering, permitted students to pursue concentrations
in security, and these degrees were both terminal and continuing.
However, the duration of the degree program varied from three to
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four years, depending on whether general education was included
or not. Ethics was more prevalent in US programs, but often cov-
ered as part of general education. All programs worldwide suffered
shortcomings in terms of curriculum due to the lack of a com-
mon understanding of what defines the cybersecurity discipline or
disciplines.
3 CURRENT STATE OF THEWORLD
This section summarizes current cybersecurity education efforts on
a global scale. Section 3.1 examines the different frameworks that
have been developed for organizing cybersecurity skills and train-
ing. Section 3.2 examines different approaches that have been taken
by different countries and organizations to increase cybersecurity
expertise. Finally, Section 3.3 examines the different curricular stan-
dards and guidance, as well as accreditation criteria that have been
developed worldwide.
3.1 Cybersecurity Skills, Training and
Education Frameworks
This subsection examines the different cybersecurity frameworks
that have been developed both within the US and elsewhere for
developing skills, providing training and education in cybersecurity.
US National Initiative for Cybersecurity
Education (NICE)
NICE [41] is an initiative of the US National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), which joins academia, governments and
private sector to develop cybersecurity education and training
framework. The NIST NICE cybersecurity framework serves as
a reference resource for describing and sharing information about
cybersecurity work as well as the knowledge, skill, and ability (KSA)
needed to complete tasks that strengthen the cybersecurity posture
of an organization.
The primary NICE strategic goal is to support employers to
plan and guide career development and workforce enhancement,
to respond to market needs and to enhance recruitment, hiring,
development and retention of cybersecurity talents. The objectives
within this strategic goal include the following [40]:
• Identify and analyze data sources to support the identifica-
tion of the present and future cybersecurity needs.
• Publish and raise awareness of the NICE Framework and
encourage its adoption as a reference resource for actions
related to cybersecurity workforce, training and education.
• Promote tools to support professionals and contracting man-
agers with recruitment, hiring, development and retention
of cybersecurity professionals.
• Promote international collaboration for sharing best prac-
tices in cybersecurity career development and workforce
planning.
To support organizations in managing roles and responsibili-
ties, the NICE framework encompasses the following core compo-
nents [40]:
• Categories comprise the overarching organizational struc-
ture of the NICE Framework. It includes seven categories and
with each category composed of specialty areas and work
roles. This organizational structure comprises a high-level
grouping of common cybersecurity functions based on ex-
tensive job analyses, which includes work and workers that
share common major functions, regardless of job titles or
other occupational conditions.
• Specialty areas are distinct areas of cybersecurity work cat-
egories. There are 32 specialty areas identified in the National
Cybersecurity Workforce Framework, version 2.0 [41].
Each specialty area represents an area of concentrated work,
or function, within cybersecurity and related work. In previ-
ous versions of the NICE framework, tasks and KSA were
associated with each specialty area. Now the KSA and Tasks
are associated with the work roles.
• Work roles are themost detailed groupings of cybersecurity
or cyber-related work, which include baseline knowledge,
skills and abilities required to perform a set of tasks. Cy-
bersecurity responsibilities and work roles are grouped into
specific classes of categories and specialty areas.
• Tasks are specific work activities that combined with other
identified tasks, comprise the work in a specific specialty
area or work roles.
• Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) consist of the
required attributes to perform tasks, generally demonstrated
through relevant experience or performance-based educa-
tion and training.
Institute of Information Security Professionals
The Institute of Information Security Professionals (IISP) has pub-
lished the IISP Skills Framework [29] that specifies a range of com-
petencies that Information Security and Information Assurance
Professionals are expected to have to effectively perform their role.
This initiative involved collaboration between private and public
organizations, academic institutions, and security experts.
The IISP report identifies six levels of skill useful for the assess-
ment of performance. Table 1 provides a summary of the meaning
of these levels as expressed in the 2018 IISP report. The six skill
levels are used against the ten skill areas specified in the framework,
as shown in Table 2. For each skill area, the framework proposes a
range of competencies that a professional should possess.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
In recent years and as a consequence of several security incidents
affecting several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mem-
ber states [37], the organization started a dedicated project Multi-
National Cyber Defense Education & Training Project (MN CD
E&T) [36], framed by its smart defense projects program, to pro-
vide NATO and allied nations the education and training necessary
to respond to these emerging threats. Even so the project is more
focused on defense aspects and despite some prevalent opinions
about the singularities of the cyber defense education [19], the
model and the process promoted by the project, in particular con-
cerning the skill set and competencies, are very similar to what we
could expect from any program to build curricula-related outputs
on cybersecurity.
MN CD E&T used, as a starting point, European Defense Agency
(EDA) and NATO specific and related documents characterizing
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Table 1: Meanings of Competency Levels
Level Trait Meaning Knowledge Practice
1 Basic knowledge of
principles/follow good
user practice (Knowl-
edge)
Acquired and can demonstrate
basic knowledge associated
with a skill
2 Knowledge and Under-
standing of basic prin-
ciples (Knowledge and
Understanding)
Understands the skill and its ap-
plication
Demonstrates basic knowledge
associated with skill; under-
stands how to apply the skill.
Can explain the principles of the skill and
how to apply it; should be aware of recent
developments in the skill.
3 Practitioner (Apply) Understands the skill and ap-
plies it to basic tasks with some
supervision.
Acquired a good understand-
ing of the knowledge associated
with the skill and how to apply
the skill
Has experience in applying the skill to a va-
riety of basic tasks; can work as an effective
member of a team; contributes ideas to the
application of the skill; has experience in
training potential and actual practitioners.
4 Senior Practitioner
(Enable)
Understands the skill and ap-
plies it to basic tasks with min-
imal supervision; normally op-
erates as a member of a team.
Acquired a deep understand-
ing of the knowledge associated
with the skill; understands how
to apply the skill.
Has experience in applying the skill to a
variety of tasks; contributes ideas in the
application of the skill; aware of recent de-
velopments in the skill; has experience in
training Information security professionals
in the skill; contributes ideas for technical
development.
5 Principal Practitioner
(Advise)
Understands the skill and ap-
plies it to complex tasks with
no supervision; leads teams in a
project; operates at a corporate
level.
Acquired a deep understand-
ing of the knowledge associ-
ated with the skill; knows how
to apply the skill across sev-
eral projects in different envi-
ronments.
Has experience in applying the skill to a
variety of complex tasks; has significant
personal responsibility or autonomy; con-
tributes ideas in the application of the skill;
contributes ideas for technical develop-
ment; has effective leadership and manage-
ment skills; demonstrates awareness of re-
cent developments in the skill; contributes
ideas for technical development.
6 Expert/Lead Practi-
tioner (Initiate, Enable,
Ensure)
An authority who leads imple-
mentation of the skill; is an ex-
pert, as acknowledged by peers
in the skill.
Same as for level 5. Has oversight responsibility for overall ap-
plication of the skill across a range of cus-
tomers; a subject matter expert within a
large organization; leads innovative work
to enhance the skill; develops and leads pro-
grams of advanced training in the skill.
Table 2: IISP Security Disciplines
SectionSecurity Discipline
A Information Security Governance and Manage-
ment
B Threat Assessment and Information Risk Man-
agement
C Implementing Secure Systems
D Assurance: Audit, Compliance and Testing
E Operational Security Management
F Incident Management, Investigation and Digital
Forensics
G (Not Used)
H Business Resilience
I Information Security Research
J Management, Leadership, Business and Commu-
nications
K Contributions to the Information Security Pro-
fession and Professional Development
target jobs and competencies, but keeping open the possibility to in-
clude similar documents (e.g., the NIST models) from other sources
both at national and international levels. With that information the
project produced a cyber defense competencies and skills specifica-
tion [31], which was used as a reference to identify a gap analysis
over the actual education and training programs. After that first ex-
ercise a set of disciplines and/or courses were generated, which will
integrate the future NATO cyber academia - replacing the actual
NATO Communication and Information Systems School, starting
in January 2019, at Oeiras, Portugal. More detailed information can
be obtained from the project site [36]. The project includes repre-
sentatives from several countries/organizations, including military,
academic and private sector, and rapidly called the attention of EU
that joined NATO in several recent cybersecurity initiatives [28].
The project and the proposed competencies model led to the
adoption of four levels of expertise that each course within the
curricula provides [31]:
• basic knowledge;
• comprehension and application;
• analysis; and
Global Perspectives on Cybersecurity Education for 2030 ITiCSE Companion ’18, July 2–4, 2018, Larnaca, Cyprus
• synthesis and evaluation.
This characterization closely follows the well-known Bloom’s
Taxonomy [13] for classification of learning outcomes, but collapses
two of the levels. This approach is linked to the hierarchical nature
of military organizations, not a justification based on outcomes
or specific skills at each level. However, the target job definition
and gap analysis appear appropriate to design courses aligned with
real-world requirements.
Summary
The frameworks analyzed above converge in several aspects, though
they use different approaches. The NATO proposal is more focused
on cyber defense, including several specific competencies (namely
those concerning defense activities), while the other two are more
related to cybersecurity. The NICE framework is more focused
on job definition and characterization, while the IISP framework
follows an organization more consistent to curricula requirements.
Note that the NATO’s framework gap analysis process and the level
of detail about skills are a useful characterization of cyber defense
skills.
3.2 Cybersecurity Strategies
This subsection takes a look at the approaches or strategies that
different countries and organizations have taken towards the de-
velopment of cybersecurity expertise.
European Union
Many countries in Europe have defined a national cybersecurity
strategy (NCSS), where the European Union Agency for Network
and Information Security (ENISA) provides a good overview [22].
European national strategies typically include objectives for build-
ing cybersecurity capabilities, enhancing awareness and for pro-
viding cybersecurity education. Some initiatives have emerged in
relation to cybersecurity education in general, especially from gov-
ernmental organizations aimed at certifying cybersecurity courses
and at providing guidelines for the subject areas that they expect
to be included within the syllabi of cybersecurity modules. These
guidelines can also serve as a set of criteria against which cyberse-
curity courses are certified.
ENISA itself published its first ”National Cyber Security Strategy
Good Practice Guide" in 2012. The 2016 version of the document an-
alyzes the status of NCSS in the European Union and the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA), and is meant to support EU member states
in their efforts to develop and update their NCSS [21]. Therefore,
the target audience of this guide are public officials and policy mak-
ers. The guide also provides useful insights for the stakeholders
involved in the life cycle of the strategy, such as private, civil and
industry stakeholders.
The ENISA guide presents six steps for the design and develop-
ment of NCSS:
(1) Set the vision, scope, objectives and priorities
(2) Follow a risk assessment approach
(3) Take stock of existing policies, regulations and capabilities
(4) Set a clear governance structure
(5) Identify and engage stakeholders
(6) Establish trusted information-sharing mechanisms
In addition, the ENISA guide describes fifteen objectives for the
implementation of NCSS:
• Develop national cyber contingency plans
• Protect critical information infrastructure
• Organize cyber security exercises
• Establish baseline security measures
• Establish incident reporting mechanisms
• Raise user awareness
• Strengthen training and educational programs
• Establish an incident response capability
• Address cyber crime
• Engage in international cooperation
• Establish a public-private partnership
• Balance security with privacy
• Institutionalize cooperation between public agencies
• Foster R&D
• Provide incentives for the private sector to invest in security
measures
The recently enacted general data protection regulation (GDPR)
sets strict requirements for adequate security assurance when build-
ing and operating ICT solutions. By definition, adequate security
assurance is the condition of being compliant with the GDPR re-
quirement of ‘privacy by design.’ The concept of ‘security by de-
sign’ denotes the elements needed to provide adequate security
assurance in general, and typically encompasses the following ele-
ments [42, 46]:
• Cybersecurity skills/training for designers, operators and
users of IT systems
• Security requirements and specification for planned systems
• Security design and architecture for planned systems
• Secure software and development of systems
• Security testing of systems
• Security in the deployment and continuous operation of
systems
• Security management within stakeholder organizations and
their partners
Note that skills/training is one of the elements of ’security by de-
sign,’ which calls for more detailed guidelines for which type of
skills/training is needed within the context of GDPR.
Australia
Like other countries, Australia has also released its cybersecurity
strategy in 2016 [11]. This strategy focuses on building a smart
nation and highlights the issue of current shortfall in the cybersecu-
rity workforce. As stated in the strategy, the issue can only be fixed
through investment in long-term cybersecurity education plans for
high schools and universities. In the first annual update released in
2017 [12], there are plans for gap identification and collaboration on
skills initiatives with international partners, such as New Zealand.
Caelli and Liu state that cybersecurity education is offered at
both undergraduate and postgraduate levels by different Australian
universities [14]. In particular, cybersecurity is offered as a major
or minor, while other universities offer some courses in association
with industry organizations in Australia. Their study provides a
data repository that could be useful for prospective students and
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others, but their analysis shows that the scope of current course
work is limited.
Some universities in Australia offer cybersecurity study units in-
stead of a complete degree program. Caelli and Liu [14] considered
forty Australian institutions: 17.5% institutions offer full degree
programs, 35% institutions offer cybersecurity as a major or minor,
27.5% institutions offer units, and 20% of them are not involved in
any cybersecurity education. In terms of course content, they found
the main focus to be on network security, with little to no focus
on topics including trusted systems, secure application software
development, and penetration testing. They highlight the need for a
holistic approach in terms of content and suggest focus on national
and global standardizations; national and global legal/regulatory
requirements in cybersecurity and cyber response; healthcare sys-
tems; future trends and technologies including Internet of Things
(IoT), cloud computing, network virtualization; trustworthy sys-
tems and their evaluation covering common criteria; and others.
Henry [26] views cybersecurity education as multidisciplinary,
and identifies gaps in university offerings and presents an educa-
tion framework for cybersecurity. These gaps were in the context
of KSA (Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities), where knowledge refers
to understanding of legal aspects of cybersecurity, while skills and
abilities cover applying techniques used in cybersecurity exercises.
Moreover, there is also a gap when it comes to developing attitude
to deal with uncertain cybersecurity situations. He investigates gen-
eralist postgraduate degree programs in Australia and concludes
that mission-specific and purpose-driven curriculum may better
prepare students for addressing skills crisis than generalist degree
programs. He concluded that “Many governments still try to initiate
a single–non-multidisciplinary–curriculum to solve the cybersecu-
rity and/or skills crisis, which will probably fall short, as discussed
above. The multidisciplinary nature of cybersecurity requires multi-
ple different streams. While this is a start for governments, more is
required and a focus on the purpose for the cybersecurity education
is critical to identify different public policy requirements, career
paths and education levels required.” Likewise, other research stud-
ies [59] also argue that cybersecurity education is an opportunity
to address the cybersecurity skills gap properly.
New Zealand
To deal with cybersecurity threats, New Zealand has defined a cy-
bersecurity strategy in 2011 [48]. One of the long-term initiatives
of this cybersecurity strategy is to meet the need for cybersecurity
professionals in New Zealand and to determine cybersecurity qual-
ifications, training, research and development in collaboration with
industry, universities, and other educational and training institu-
tions. Fourie et al. [25] state that many tertiary institutions in New
Zealand have realized the need for cybersecurity education since
the 2011 cybersecurity strategy. Generally, cybersecurity educa-
tion is in the form of a number of undergraduate and postgraduate
courses with cybersecurity content.
According to New Zealand’s cybersecurity strategy 2015 [49],
one goal in the action plan is to build cybersecurity capabilities.
Achieving this goal requires the education and training system
for addressing cyber hygiene practices. To this end, several ter-
tiary institutions have already incorporated cybersecurity into their
courses and curriculum. One of the main action points to develop
cybersecurity capability is the promotion of cybersecurity educa-
tion by identifying gaps in cybersecurity training.
The first annual report on the implementation of the cybersecu-
rity strategy’s action plan [50] mentions that a cybersecurity skills
task force has been established to address the shortage of cyber-
security skills. This task force has representatives from industry,
academia, and education. One main outcome of this task force is
expected to be improved understanding of cybersecurity training
at different levels in education including primary, secondary, and
tertiary. A proposal has been made for developing a diploma in
cybersecurity of level 6, per New Zealand qualifications framework
(NZQF) standards by 2017.
A draft diploma in cybersecurity [38] has been designed to pro-
duce graduates capable of applying cybersecurity skills, knowledge,
and practice and to work per professional standards independently
and in teams. This diploma requires 120 credits that include 90
credits for technical skills and 30 for core skills. The technical skills
cover identification of assets and stakeholders (10 credits), analyzing
technologies (15 credits), risk assessment (20 credits), determining
controls (25 credits), incident handling (15 credits), analyzing legal,
and privacy and ethical impacts (5 credits). The core skills include
behaving responsibly (10 credits), communication and soft skills
(10 credits), and project management (10 credits).
Several master’s programs are offered in New Zealand. A master
of professional studies in digital security program is offered by
the University of Auckland [10]. Victoria University of Wellington
also offers a master of computer science with an option to choose
cybersecurity courses.
Summary
A substantial number of countries have already developed and
published a cybersecurity strategy, after recent evidence related
to cybersecurity incidents, the assumption of the high impact of
those incidents and the evidence of a shortage of professionals in
this (rapidly) emerging area.
In 2018, the Canadian National Cyber Security Strategy recog-
nized the role of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM) and the need for Canadian graduates to to specialize in
the skills needed to address the increasing demand for cyber secu-
rity jobs [47]. The 2016 National Occupational Classification can
be used to find a listing of a variety of cybersecurity related job
positions, for example, informatics security analyst, informatics
security consultant, internet security analyst, systems security an-
alyst, systems security planner, intelligence analyst, intelligence
officer and intelligence operator [32]. However, there is no devel-
oped cybersecurity education framework such as the US Centers
for Academic Excellence [34] or the NIST NICE Framework [39].
At the EU level, developing such a strategy was mandated for
all members, with all cybersecurity strategies looking generally
similar in terms of cybersecurity education and training. However,
there are differences in levels of detail and inked action plans, with
some countries leading in initiatives for establishing different levels
of cybersecurity courses.
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3.3 Standards and Curricular Guidelines
This subsection explores some initiatives to set up standards and
provide curricular guidance in two countries: the United Kingdom
and the United States, as well as other attempts by professional
computer societies and accreditation organizations.
United Kingdom
One governmental initiative worthmentioning is that of the UK gov-
ernment which has established the National Cybersecurity Centre
(NCSC) that certifies bachelor and master degrees in cybersecurity
and closely related fields, using IISP’s skills framework Institute of
Information Security Professionals [29]. At the bachelor level, the
scheme [54] certifies degrees in:
• Computer science for cybersecurity. This category involves
degrees that are addressing underpinning computer science
relevant to cybersecurity.
• Computer science and cybersecurity. This category concerns
degrees that provide a general, broad foundation in cyberse-
curity.
• Computer science and digital forensics. Degrees considered
in this category provide a foundation in digital forensics.
For each degree pathway, there are indicative topics that one
would expect to find within the syllabus of bachelor-level mod-
ules. For all degree pathways, there are common computer science
subject areas that students should learn. These include:algorithms
and complexity; architecture and organization; discrete structures;
programming languages; software development fundamentals; soft-
ware engineering; systems fundamentals; security fundamentals;
networks; operating systems; human-computer interaction; infor-
mation management; secure programming; low level techniques
and tools; systems programming; embedded systems; social issues
and professional practice.
For a computer science and cybersecurity degree, the program
should cover the following areas: information securitymanagement;
information risk management; implementing secure systems; infor-
mation assurance methodologies and testing; operational security
management; incident management; audit, assurance and review;
business continuity management; information systems research;
and professional skills.
The following subject areas are considered essential for a com-
puter science and digital forensics degree. They include: founda-
tions of digital forensics; digital Forensic analysis; digital Forensic
practice; application of digital forensics; legal process; information
security; and evidence handling and management.
Initiatives from industry associations provide other guidelines,
promoting specific cybersecurity skill competencies. For example,
the Tech Partnership is a network of UK employers that collabo-
rate to identify the skills needed for the UK digital economy. One
objective of the partnership is to improve the quality of digital
skills training and education by setting apprenticeship standards
and developing degree apprenticeship programs to meet employ-
ers’ needs. To this end, the partnership has published standards
related to information security [52] that indicate the competencies,
knowledge and understanding that a person should have, depend-
ing on the years of experience (0-2, 3-5, 6-9, 10+). The standards fall
under the following categories: information security governance;
risk assessment and management; secure development and secu-
rity architecture; security testing; secure operations management,
vulnerability assessments, and identity and access management;
intrusion detection, incident investigation and management, and
digital forensics; audit, compliance and assurance; and business
resilience.
Another initiative is taken by the assessment and qualification
alliance (AQA) that provides academic and vocational qualifications
taught in UK and international schools and colleges. In the context
of cybersecurity, they have published advanced technical qualifi-
cations [9], built in collaboration with employers and professional
bodies. The alliance specifies the following two qualifications. The
Foundation Technical Level IT: Cybersecurity qualification is made up
of four mandatory units. These include: fundamental principles of
computing; communication technologies; developing and maintain-
ing computer networks; and network threats and vulnerabilities.
The Technical Level IT: Cybersecurity and Security Administration
qualification is made up of seven mandatory units and two optional
units (one of which must be studied): fundamental principles of
computing; communication technologies; developing and main-
taining computer networks; network threats and vulnerabilities;
mathematics for computing; network and cybersecurity adminis-
tration; managing identity and access to systems; programming
for networking and security (optional unit); and computer forensic
investigation (optional unit)
United States
This subsection on the efforts in the United States is heavily adapted
from a recent presentation made by two of the authors, along with
Edward Sobiesk, Joseph J. Ekstrom, Andrew Hall and Shannon Gor-
man [44]. Within the USA, cybersecurity curriculum development
and evolution has been influenced by several sources. First, ACM
and the IEEE Computer Society published the Computing Curricula
series with an overview volume called CC2005 [24] that references
separate volumes for each of the recognized computing disciplines:
• IS2010 (Information Systems) [5]
• CS2013 (Computer Science) [6]
• SE2014 (Software Engineering) [43]
• CE2016 (Computer Engineering) [7]
• IT2017 (Information Technology) [8]
A sixth volume was recently published for cybersecurity called
CSEC2017 [30], and the CC2005 [24] is currently in revision with
the next version to be released as CC2020.
The National Security Agency (NSA) and Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) support cybersecurity education in colleges
and universities within the US via the National Centers of Academic
Excellence in Cyber Defense (CAE-2Y for 2-year colleges, CAE-CDE
for 4-year colleges, and CAE-R for research universities) designa-
tion. Depending on its type, each institution must successfully map
its curriculum to the core Knowledge Units (KUs), optional KUs,
and focus areas [34]. These designations ensure an appropriate cy-
bersecurity curriculum is available within the institution. However,
these programs do not require an institution to assess and evaluate
formally the graduates that have achieved their degree’s learning
outcomes.
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Complementing the CAE-CD effort are the national centers of
academic excellence (CAE) for cyber-operations programs [35] in
support of the presidential national initiative for cybersecurity
education (NICE) [39] to increase the number of cybersecurity
trained professionals. Unlike the CAE-CD effort, the CAE-cyber-
operations designates a student as having completely satisfied all
of the mandatory knowledge unit requirements and at least four of
the optional knowledge units in terms of their transcript or degree.
Only a small number of institutions have achieved the CAE-cyber-
operations certification.
Accreditation and Curricular Guidelines
We now examine efforts in accrediting cybersecurity programs,
based on curricular guidelines provided by various professional
computing societies including the ACM and IEEE Computer Society.
ABET is a US-based international organization dedicated to disci-
plinary accreditation in computing, engineering, engineering tech-
nology and applied and natural sciences. ABET is organized around
the concept of commissions, where each commission is respon-
sible for accrediting programs with common themes. ABET has
commissions for each of the aforementioned themes: computing
accreditation commission (CAC), engineering accreditation com-
mission (EAC), engineering technology accreditation commission
(ETAC), and applied and natural science accreditation commission
(ANSAC).
Each commission has a set of general criteria that are required to
be met for all programs accredited by that commission, along with
more specific program criteria that programs of various disciplines
must meet. Recently the CAC general criteria were enhanced to in-
clude a significant cybersecurity curricular requirement for all com-
puting programs. CAC currently accredits programs in computer
science (CS), information systems (IS) and information technology
(IT). That is, CAC has a set of general criteria for all programs and
then a separate set of program criteria for each of CS, IS and IT.
ABET cybersecurity program criteria [2] were recently published in
draft form for execution within CAC as a fourth type of computing
program, in addition to CS, IS and IT. Similar ABET activities have
taken place under the EAC for cybersecurity engineering programs.
These efforts fall into two categories. The category 1 effort repre-
sents approaches that integrate cybersecurity content with existing
computing-based disciplines, while the category 2 effort represents
the creation of a stand-alone discipline for cybersecurity. The cate-
gory 1 effort has been prevalent in US-based education for more
than twenty years, while the category 2 effort is emerging as a new
movement. These two approaches are detailed as follows.
Category 1: Integration with Existing Computing Programs.
The ACM/IEEE-CS curriculum volumes have generally evolved
to incorporate cybersecurity concepts within each of the latest
versions that include the following:
• Computer Engineering (CE2016): CE2016 [7] defines the
terms: knowledge area, knowledge unit, core learning out-
comes, and elective learning outcomes. CE2016 then de-
scribes 12 recommended knowledge areas, with informa-
tion security as one of them. In particular, CE2016 explicitly
describes 20 hours of cybersecurity content, which is recom-
mended for inclusion across the curriculum. Cybersecurity
is also suggested as a potential area of emphasis, or a trade-
off, when learning requisite design skills that need to occur
throughout the entire CE curriculum) [7].
• Computer Science (CS2013): CS2013 [6] provides an over-
all taxonomy for the discipline consisting of knowledge areas
(KAs), knowledge units (KUs), topics and learning outcomes
(LOs). For security, CS2013 recommends 9 lesson hours of
concepts where the depth is unique to information assurance
and security and an additional 63.5 lesson hours of infor-
mation assurance and security content that is “integrated
into other knowledge areas that reflect naturally implied
or specified topics with a strong role in security concepts
and topics” [6]. These integrated CS cybersecurity curricular
recommendations are mostly technical material that apply
to the aspect of the curriculum being covered.
• Information Systems (IS2010): IS2010 [5] uses courses for
its organization, with a BoK extracted into an appendix.
There are seven core courses and seven sample elective
courses enumerated. Topics and learning outcomes are listed
in the course outlines. Although the IS BoK appendix does
not explicitly mention security when listing recommended
knowledge areas, security recommendations are included
in six of the seven sample core courses, and security is the
main theme for two of the sample elective courses. Note that
IS2010 is the oldest of the current curriculum volumes, and
is now almost ten years old.
• Information Technology (IT2017): IT2017 [8] includes a
set of core information technology domains and supple-
mental information technology domains with subdomains.
IT2017 recommends the cybersecurity content occupy ap-
proximately 10% of the IT curriculum, with most of the ma-
terial covered throughout the curriculum instead of just in
one course. In fact, due to the robustness of cybersecurity in
information technology as presented in the IT2017 report,
one can make the case that any IT degree program could be
viewed as a cybersecurity program [20].
• Software Engineering (SE2014): SE2014 [43] provides a
knowledge area, knowledge unit, topic hierarchy with topics
tagged with the expected level of coverage (knowledge, com-
prehension, or application), which correspond to Bloom’s
cognitive domain taxonomy simplified to three levels. Secu-
rity is one of SE2014’s ten recommended knowledge areas,
and SE2014 includes 20 hours of explicitly recommended
security content. In a manner similar to CS2013, however,
SE2014 clarifies that the “relatively small number of hours
assigned to the software quality (QUA) and security (SEC)
knowledge units reflects that these areas represent cross-
cutting concerns that are closely linked to topics in other
knowledge units. They have been identified separately to
increase their visibility and to recognize their importance
across the entire extent of the software engineering disci-
pline” [43].
The above curricular reports demonstrate a general increase in
cybersecurity content as the disciplines have evolved. ABET has
supported this evolution by adding EAC program criteria for cy-
bersecurity engineering programs and adding a CAC requirement
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to the general criteria for all computing programs, which requires
the inclusion of “principles and practices for secure computing”
within the curriculum [1]. The revised criteria have not yet been de-
ployed, and so they have not yet impacted the content of accredited
computing programs in the large. Evaluating the effect of ABET’s
actions on cybersecurity education will be an important area for
future examination and research.
Regarding the impact of the CAE program on the integration
of cybersecurity content into existing programs, we note that of
162 NSA CAE institutions, only 36 offered degrees in 2016 classi-
fied as “information security” based on required reporting to the
US Department of Education Integrated postsecondary education
data system (IPEDS) [56]. This means that most of the effect of
CAE has been on infusing non-information security programs with
cybersecurity content.
Category 2: Standalone Cybersecurity Programs. As noted
above, the five longstanding ACM/IEEE-CS curriculum volumes
have supported the integration of cybersecurity concepts into ex-
isting computing disciplines. The integration approach has been
complemented by ABET and NSA/DHS CAE. However, many re-
cent efforts have also supported the development of standalone
cybersecurity programs.
Notably, the recently published CSEC2017 [30] primarily lays a
foundation for standalone cybersecurity programs. “The CSEC2017
curricular volume will be the leading resource of comprehensive
cybersecurity curricular content for global academic institutions
seeking to develop a broad range of cybersecurity offerings at the
post-secondary level”. The CSEC2017 report presents a “model” of
cybersecurity that consists of three parts: knowledge areas, cross-
cutting concepts and a set of disciplinary lenses [30].
Parrish et al. [44] discuss how the CSEC2017 disciplinary lens
permits existing computing disciplines to absorb security content
within the desired discipline [44]. A “mixed disciplinary” lens helps
to capture cybersecurity in the context of a “computing + X” in-
terdisciplinary combination, e.g., cybersecurity in the context of
bioinformatics. While CSEC2017 allows cybersecurity concepts to
be contextualized, the vision of CSEC2017 permits cybersecurity
to be a separate, standalone discipline with different “flavors” of
degrees.
CSEC2017 has been reinforced by the introduction of ABET
accreditation criteria for cybersecurity degree programs [1]. As of
the time of this writing, there are now four cybersecurity programs
that have been accredited under these criteria, with several other
cybersecurity programs anticipated to apply for this accreditation.
Parrish et al. [44] also note that the number of US institutions
offering cybersecurity degrees has shown a remarkable 100% in-
crease in the total number over the five-year period from 2012 to
2016 [56]. The number of degrees has been slowly rising, with 13
new institutions beginning to offer cybersecurity degrees during
this period. However, as both cybersecurity degrees and institutions
are fairly low, substantial growth is needed in both degrees and
institutions to meet workforce needs [44].
The standalone approach requires an identifiable “community”
for institutions that have adopted the standalone program approach.
While several of these institutions are part of the CAE community
and most are part of the cybersecurity community writ large, there
is still the need for greater collaboration and information sharing
that is unique to the standalone program institutions. These insti-
tutions will share similar concerns regarding program approval,
accreditation, hiring of cybersecurity faculty, developing an aca-
demic research community and generally establishing a disciplinary
identity. The creation and use of open source data, similar to that
used in the Taulbee survey for computing [60], will enable cyberse-
curity programs to calibrate their resources to accommodate the
marketplace and assess strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and
threats. The need for a cybersecurity professional community and
underlying academic discipline was also recently identified [51].
4 FUTURE CYBERSECURITY DYNAMICS
This section presents three significant aspects related to the future
dynamics of cybersecurity. One addresses proposed framework for
cybersecurity education. The second addresses the meaning of a
competency-based approach in education. The third outlines how
minimal competencies in cybersecurity can be described for the
2030s.
4.1 A Framework for Cybersecurity Education
As a framework to discuss cybersecurity education, we propose two
overall approaches. The first approach is to augment traditional
computing programs with cybersecurity content. This “integra-
tion method” is supported by, and in many cases the result of, the
addition of significant cybersecurity content into all five of the
longstanding ACM/IEEE-CS detailed curriculum volumes that con-
tain recommendations for computer engineering, computer science,
information systems, information technology, and software engi-
neering. Alternatively, institutions are also developing brand new
standalone cybersecurity programs. This latter approach attacks
the workforce development gap directly by educating graduates
who are credentialed as cybersecurity professionals. This “stan-
dalone method” is being energized by the recent publication of
the ACM/IEEE-CS detailed curriculum volume for cybersecurity
called CSEC2017 [30]. It is useful to consider several questions in
the context of this framework:
(1) Are we seeing the integration method result in new degree
programs or are we simply seeing changes in existing pro-
grams?
(2) Does the standalone method result in (fundamentally) one
new type of degree program or several?
(3) Is cybersecurity a subset of computing or is it orthogonal to
it?
(4) Is it possible to identify the participants in the cybersecurity
educational community?
(5) Is it more useful to think of cybersecurity as degree pro-
gram(s), discipline(s) or both?
We first consider why these questions are important and some
fundamentals that are raised by the questions.
Question 1: Integration = New Degree Programs? When security
concepts are integrated with CS, IS, IT, SE and CE, are the degree
programs that result fundamentally a new thing?We note that there
are three different things possibly happening. First, disciplinary cur-
riculum models are increasingly integrating more security concepts
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with the fundamentals in each of the disciplines. Each of the recent
curriculum models (CS2013, IT2017, SE2014 and CE2016) added
security to the curriculum content [4]. ABET recently followed
suit by now requiring security as a fundamental concept that must
be taught in any computing program [1]. So it can definitely be
argued that newer versions of each of the computing disciplines
will require more security content than in the past.
It can also be argued that many existing degree programs in CS,
IS, IT, SE and CE are adding variants and concentrations that are
security specific. This is frequently accomplished by within existing
programs’ flexibility to specify a set of security courses as a track or
a concentration. Such approaches have been common in most fields
and do not represent anything particularly new and fundamentally
different—except that the number of such concentrations is believed
to be increasing.
Third, there are new degree programs being created in security
that are clearly descended from individual programs in CS, IS, IT,
SE or CE. These new programs are perhaps called “cybersecurity”
or perhaps other names that more directly reflect specializations of
existing degree programs (“secure software systems” or “network
security”) but are hyper-specializations of existing programs. These
are distinguished from tracks or specializations within existing
programs by the amount of cybersecurity content and the degree
to which content from the original ancestor program is retained.
This type of program is indeed something “new and different” and
there are challenges with creating such programs. To wit, is it
possible to develop cybersecurity content without “base” content
from the ancestor discipline? The more cybersecurity content that
is included, the less content is possible from the base discipline.
How can the new thing be covered without fully covering the
old? In most cases, the cybersecurity content requires a depth of
understanding within the cognate discipline.
Question 2: Standalone = One degree or several? Several varieties
of standalone degrees can be conceptualized, all of which could be
called cybersecurity. Obviously, degrees may be specializations of
any of the existing computing degree programs, as noted above.
Standalone degrees may also be more crosscutting. For example, the
US Naval Academy has a degree program called “cyber operations”
– which is based on the principles of offensive and defensive cyber
operations. This degree program integrates concepts from computer
science, computer engineering, systems engineering and political
science.
As stated earlier, cybersecurity degree programs can be and have
been blended from concepts across a wide spectrum of disciplines.
The emphasis area, e.g., networking or cyber criminology, can lead
to substantially different degree programs, all named with a “cy-
bersecurity” title or other similarly generic name, but representing
“small-cybersecurity.” The broader notion of “big-cybersecurity” is
the meta-discipline, as shown in Figure 1.
Question 3: Subset of Computing? While certain notions of cyberse-
curity could be argued to be computing disciplines, big-cybersecurity
appears to include content and disciplinary components that go
beyond computing. CSEC2017 [30], which defines curriculum con-
tent for big-cybersecurity, includes a substantial amount of social
science content. Some specific cybersecurity disciplines could be
viewed as computing disciplines, but others are clearly not comput-
ing (e.g., cyber criminology).
This notion of big-cybersecurity may become confusing when
ABET defines computing or engineering accreditation criteria for
cybersecurity, which effectively define requirements for a curricu-
lum or degree program in cybersecurity - as if cybersecurity were a
specific computing discipline. This does not reflect the broad notion
of big-cybersecurity that is defined in CSEC2017, but it is rather a
much more restricted notion of cybersecurity that is simply one
variant within a broad spectrum of variants (that also happens to
be a computing discipline as well).
Figure 2 shows the broad notion of big-cybersecurity alongside
the more restricted version of small-cybersecurity that could be a
subset of both big-cybersecurity and computing or big-cybersecurity
and engineering. While a significant number of computing-oriented
or engineering-oriented cybersecurity programs may exist, it is not
the same as the big-cybersecurity that is reflected by CSEC2017
or by many discussions within the educational community. The
authors suggest that the community use cybersecurity to mean
big-cybersecurity and other words be used for small-cybersecurity
notions and for other variants.
Question 4: Cybersecurity Educational Community? For cybersecu-
rity to grow as an entity, it needs to be possible to identify the
community of educational practitioners. This appears to be a dif-
ficult problem because “cybersecurity” is an amorphous term to
begin with. However, an inclusive approach would suggest that
the scope of the community goes beyond simply the computing
community. In particular, IEEE-CS and ACM do not have SIGs that
capture this community. To really obtain maximum intellectual
synergy from this community, there needs to be a professional
society. There also needs to be a formal identification process for
community stakeholders, and open source data captured to reflect
potential stakeholders within the community.
Question 5: Degree Programs, Disciplines or Both? We claim that it
is time to look at cybersecurity as a meta-discipline with a BoK,
educational programs, a supply of PhD graduates to become faculty
members, and a community of educational practice. This will enable
a more fundamentals-driven approach to designing curricula, and
a more long-lasting, durable base of knowledge and competencies.
The risk of this approach is that the field could “go out of busi-
ness” if there are technical solutions that emerge that defeat the
adversary and generally eliminate insecurity of systems. Should
that time come, it may be that there is no longer a need for degree
programs or bodies of knowledge (or any of the other trappings of a
community). As such a future is by no means certain and given the
intervening international crisis in the area coupled with the lack of
human resources, we believe that the risk of taking a disciplinary
approach is outweighed by the downside risk of not taking such an
approach.
These questions require addressing in the context of current ed-
ucational efforts in different parts of the world. By framing this
discussion of worldwide efforts in terms of these questions, edu-
cators can assess how current efforts may affect these questions
over the next ten years. The current efforts seem to point toward an
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Figure 2: Breadth of Cybersecurity
emerging cybersecurity meta-discipline – or field of study – that en-
compasses technology, engineering, computing, and social science
components. This would result in a variety of different types of
degree programs framed within existing disciplines or within new
disciplines. The next subsection contains information surrounding
the competency model that is useful to frame the cybersecurity
meta-discipline just discussed.
4.2 Cybersecurity Competencies for 2030
It is a challenge to determine what cybersecurity might be in the
future. Recent documents such as the one produced by the IISP [29],
the CSEC2017 report [30], and other related publications focus on
current cybersecurity efforts. They serve as useful references for
the current situation. For example, the CSEC2017 report identifies
eight areas of cybersecurity that include data, software, compo-
nent, connection, system, human, organizational, and societal areas.
The 2018 IISP report illustrates ten active security skills as already
shown in Table 2.
The narrative that follows addresses the vision of the authors on
the future of cybersecurity, particularly as it might appear in 2030.
The approach taken is that cybersecurity should be a component of
all bachelor degree programs, including programs beyond comput-
ing. This multidisciplinary approach underscores the importance
of basic cybersecurity exposure whether it occurs in engineering,
science, business, or philosophy. An educated global community
should have a minimal exposure to cybersecurity. The only differ-
ence is the level of that exposure.
Competency and its Meaning
In modern literature, we have witnessed an influx of the word “com-
petency” used in a variety of contexts. Unfortunately, in some/many
cases people use it loosely as a current “buzz word” without perti-
nent meaning. However, some groups have formed concrete mean-
ings for competency. For example, the Software Engineering Com-
petency Model (2014) [27] states that competency is:
The demonstrated ability to performwork activities at
a stated competency level, which is one of five increas-
ing levels of ability to perform an activity denoted
as technician, entry-level practitioner, practitioner,
technical leader, or senior software engineer.
In essence, this definition suggests that competency is some
combination of knowledge, skill, and ability. The MSIS2016 docu-
ment [53] states:
Competencies represent a dynamic combination of
cognitive and meta-cognitive skills, demonstration of
knowledge and understanding, interpersonal, intel-
lectual and practical skills, and ethical values.
The IT2017 report has formulated a constructive and canonical
definition of competency based on pedagogical theory and use
in multiple professions of practice such as medicine. Contrasting
competency with learning outcomes, the IT2017 report states that:
Learning outcomes are written statements of what
a learner is expected to know and be able to demon-
strate at the end of a learning unit (or cohesive set
of units, course module, entire course, or full pro-
gram) [8].
The report also states:
Competence refers to the performance standards asso-
ciated with a profession or membership to a licensing
organization. Assessing some level of performance in
the workplace is often used as a competence measure,
which means measuring aspects of the job at which a
person is competent [8].
Thus, the essential difference between a competency and a learn-
ing outcome is that the focus of competency is on performance in
professional context [8], namely that:
Competency = Knowledge + Technical Skill + Human Disposition
Knowledge is simply not sufficient to become a successful practicing
professional in cybersecurity. In industry, for example, technical
skill and human disposition are often more important than just
knowledge. Figure 3 illustrates this understanding in an information
technology context, where the intersection of the triple–knowledge,
skills, and disposition–describes the intended competency.
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)
Figure 3: Illustration of competency for information technology
Table 3: Domains of “cybersecurity”
Tag Domain Components
A Governance Policy, Strategy, Compliance,
Standardization
B Risk Management Threat modeling, Asset evalu-
ation, Mitigation, Vulnerabili-
ties
C Constraints Legal (including regulatory),
Ethical, Organizational, Politi-
cal, Privacy
D Controls Administrative, Physical,
Technical
4.3 Cybersecurity Competency Domains
By most accounts, the three essential pillars of security are confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). All security methods,
approaches, or systems must possess these attributes, whether a
brick-and-mortar structure or a computer network. One would not
trust any security system that lacks any one of these principles. Nat-
urally, all bachelor programs in the cybersecurity meta-discipline
must include a study of these pillars.
For the field of cybersecurity and its related academic programs,
the authors have generated four domains that are endogenous to
the field. That is, any cybersecurity program (e.g., cyber criminol-
ogy, network security, secure software development) must have
competencies related to these four domains, which are governance,
risk management, constraints, and controls. Table 3 identifies the
four domains and their related components.
Action Verbs
The IISP report suggests six levels of skills useful for the assessment
of practitioner performance. Table 1 had provided a summary of
the meaning of these levels. Table 4 presents some suggestions for
action verbs taken from the 2018 IISP report and other sources.
The action verbs listed in this table have similarities to the well-
known Bloom’s Taxonomy [13]. Each IISP level seems to focus on
Table 4: Action Verb Suggestions
Level Action Verbs <A-verb>
1 Define, Describe, Draw, Identify, Label, List, Locate,
Memorize, Name, Recite, Recognize, Select, State,
Write
2 Change, Confirm, Explain, Express, Illustrate, In-
corporate, Match, Monitor, Paraphrase, Present,
Provide, Restate, Transform
3 Apply, Assist, Change, Choose, Classify, Collect,
Conduct, Contribute, Convey, Develop, Discover,
Draft, Dramatize, Draw, Interpret, Maintain, Make,
Model, Modify, Paint, Perform, Prepare, Present,
Produce, Report, Show, Undertake, Use, Write
4 Analyze, Apply, Categorize, Classify, Compare,
Construct, Contrast, Contribute, Control, Deliver,
Design, Differentiate, Distinguish, Examine, Im-
plement, Infer, Incorporate, Investigate, Operate,
Oversee, Point-out, Research, Select, Separate,
Share, Subdivide, Supervise, Support, Survey, Take-
apart, Use
5 Analyze, Append, Assess, Combine, Communicate,
Construct, Create, Develop, Design, Encourage,
Formulate, Hypothesize, Invent, Lead, Manage, Or-
ganize, Originate, Plan, Produce, Role-Play, What-
if
6 Advise, Apprise, Assess, Audit, Authorize, Com-
pare, Coordinate, Criticize, Critique, Decide, De-
velop, Direct, Evaluate, Influence, Judge, Persuade,
Recommend, Relate, Solve, Summarize, Weigh
the cybersecurity expertise associated with that level, not whether
the different IISP levels can be ranked in terms of learning.
The listing represents only suggestions for verb use and does
not portray an exhaustive collection of action verbs suitable for
cybersecurity competencies. One must take the action verbs in
context. For example, to develop a program to do a search for a
name in a database is quite different than to develop a program
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for a flight control system. In the first case, it is a level 1 or level 2
activity; in the second case, it would be a level 5 or level 6 activity.
In reality, a recent graduate from a bachelor program in cyber-
security would not have the capacity or the ability to engage in
activities at level 5 or level 6. These graduates are just starting their
professional careers and their typical ages are likely to be the early
twenties. Thus, for this purpose, we would only consider levels 1
through 4 from the IISP scale.
Building Competencies
It is possible now to build competencies for all cybersecurity disci-
plines by using the elements from Tables 3 and 4 according to the
string concatenation algorithm:
<A-verb> <D-phrase>
where <A-verb> is an action verb used at an indicated level as
in Table 4 and where <D-phrase> is a domain phrase assembled
from the components in Table 3. The choice of the action verb
associated with the domain phrase depends on the level of the
expected competence.
Example 1.
A competency of a recent graduate from a bachelor program in
business administration working for a government agency could
be:
Explain the content of a security policy of a contract with a vendor.
Here, <A-verb> = “Explain” derives from level 1 and <Dphrase>
derives from Tag A.
Example 2.
A competency of a recent graduate from a bachelor program in
computer engineering working for a security company could be:
Develop a program to mitigate vulnerabilities on a computer system.
In this case, <A-verb> = “Develop” derives from level 3 and <Dphrase>
derives from Tag B.
Example 3.
A competency of a recent graduate from a bachelor program in
cybersecurity working for a security technology company could
be:
Design a control interface for a computer system.
Here, <A-verb> = “Design” derives from level 4 and <Dphrase>
derives from Tag D.
Cybersecurity Models
It is now possible to develop models for cybersecurity. Recall that
the four domains tagged A, B, C, and D represent minimal, generic
parts of full bachelor programs that contain one or more cyberse-
curity components. For example, a university may have a general
education specification whereby all students must take a module
or course typically titled “Introduction to Cybersecurity" as a grad-
uation requirement. Thus, students specializing in mathematics,
philosophy, engineering, art, computing, or journalism must have
some exposure to cybersecurity. In this case, all students regardless
of their specialty will all have some level of exposure to the four
domains (A,B,C,D) at least at level 1. We would expect a philosophy
specialist to cover these areas at level 1 or occasionally at level 2.
On the other hand, we would expect students enrolled in a cyber-
security degree program to have expertise in the four domains at
level 3 or level 4.
It is now possible to generate models of minimal competencies in
cybersecurity for any bachelor program. We do this by combining
(1) the full set of domains with their related components, and (2)
the associated levels relative to the specialty or curriculum. The
following models illustrate how to do this.
We begin by creating competencies for a given bachelor program
following the process already specified. That is, for each component
of each domain, produce a competency at the expected level for
the program. For the four domain areas, there are a total of sixteen
components. Therefore, there will be sixteen minimal competencies
for any given program.
To illustrate this model, we then form a table listing the four
domains with their components in the first column and the levels in
the next four columns. As already mentioned, it is not necessary to
list all six levels from the 2018 IISP report because recent graduates
from bachelor programs would not have the capacity to engage at
the fifth and sixth levels. The resulting matrix acts as a snapshot of
the minimal competency model. Table entries reflect the fact that a
recent graduate with competency at level N has obviously achieved
a competency at level N-1 for N = 2, 3, or 4.
Category 1: Information Technology Program with a Cyber-
security Track.
We begin by constructing competencies for this program accord-
ing to the string concatenation algorithm already discussed. Since
students in this program are information technology specialists
(not cybersecurity specialists), we would not expect high levels of
expertise. The sixteen competencies appear in Table 5.
We now construct a table graph according to the process men-
tioned. A typical “snapshot” for such a program is as shown in
Table 6. The table illustrates the expected levels of competency
for each of the sixteen domains. Note that the . . . denote the actual
constructed values.
Category 2: Cybersecurity Bachelor Program.
As before, we begin by constructing competencies for this program
according to the string concatenation process already discussed.
Since students in this program are cybersecurity specialists, we
would expect relatively high levels of expertise. The sixteen com-
petencies appear in Table 7.
We now construct a table graph according to the process men-
tioned. A typical “snapshot” for such a program is as shown in
Table 8. The table illustrates the expected levels of competency for
each of the sixteen domains. Again, note that the . . . denote the
actual constructed values.
Competencies for the 2030s
We can use the concatenation algorithm coupled with the examples
and models to construct cybersecurity competencies for the future.
That is, the algorithmic process developed is a “living process” that
provides a framework for dynamically developing competencies in
cybersecurity that may vary over time.
The authors believe that the cybersecurity competencies stated
herein found in the Models 1 and 2 competency tables provide two
such cybersecurity cases. Obviously, there are many possibilities
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Table 5: Competencies for Model 1
Domain Competency Example
GOVERNANCE
Policy Write a summary of an organizational information security policy for a supervisor.
Strategy Recognize strategic plans of a corporate division.
Compliance Describe the compliance requirements of an organization.
Standardization Paraphrase and explain security standards to a group of peers.
RISK MANAGEMENT
Threat modeling Explain the security threats that may compromise corporate assets.
Asset evaluation Illustrate to a team the asset value characterization of a corporate unit considering its use.
Mitigation Describe security countermeasures to mitigate identified risks to a government unit.
Vulnerability State an asset’s vulnerabilities in a presentation.
CONSTRAINTS
Legal Describe applicable laws, statutes, and regulatory documents to a set of peers.
Ethical List existing ethical codes of conduct for a company.
Organizational Restate baseline system security requirements in accordance with applicable security policy
Privacy Incorporate privacy laws or regulations in main system requirements
Political Describe to a corporate unit the different sensibilities of all stakeholders concerning system specification
and design.
CONTROLS
Administrative Monitor and maintain server configuration by providing incident response and business continuity for a
local institution.
Physical Describe physical risks associated with critical assets in a security report.
Technical Provide adequate access controls based on principles of least privilege and need-to-know for a local
company.
Table 6: Snapshot of Model 1
Domain L1 L2 L3 L4
GOVERNANCE
Policy . . .
Strategy . . .
Compliance . . .
Standardization . . . . . .
RISK MANAGEMENT
Threat modeling . . . . . .
Asset evaluation . . . . . .
Mitigation . . .
Vulnerability . . . . . .
CONSTRAINTS
Legal . . .
Ethical . . .
Organizational . . . . . .
Privacy . . . . . .
Political . . .
CONTROLS
Administrative . . . . . .
Physical . . .
Technical . . . . . .
based on the curriculum at hand and the four levels of action verbs.
As before, for degree programs that may require a general edu-
cation requirement in cybersecurity, the sixteen components of
the four domains, competencies would likely be mostly at level 1.
Basically, there are sixty-four (16 components * 4 levels) possible
competency models derivable from the process mentioned with an
infinite number of competency statements. The competencies pro-
vided for Models 1 and 2 are the authors’ initial attempt to provide
guidance to this important area.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This report has focused on defining a vision for a discipline of
cybersecurity that consists of fundamental, enduring content. Our
prediction is that many different types of programs will emerge
over the next ten years - to the point that it is not possible to define
cybersecurity as a single discipline, but as a family of disciplines.
As such, we have coined the term big-cybersecurity to denote the
family of disciplines such as the study of digital, technology-based
systems in the face of an adversary.
This paper has reviewed the history of the overall cybersecurity
area and how it has evolved from viewing computer security as an
augmentation of existing disciplines, to a fairly broad spectrum of
independent disciplines that constitute the cybersecurity as a meta-
discipline. The authors have provided an overall meta-disciplinary
framework for cybersecurity and have characterized cybersecurity
in terms of an abstract set of competencies.
This paper represents the beginning of a meta-disciplinary view
of cybersecurity driven by the need to provide guidance to higher
education when implementing cybersecurity programs. The over-
all educational ecosystem must scale-up to meet extraordinary
workforce demands and international crises associated with the
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Table 7: Competencies for Model 2
Domain Competency Example
GOVERNANCE
Policy Develop policy, programs, and guidelines for implementation within an enterprise.
Strategy Describe strategic plans for security defense for a government agency.
Compliance Design the security compliance processes and audit controls for an external services organization.
Standardization Prepare an impact (costs and benefits) report of recent changes made to standards and procedures of an
organization.
RISK MANAGEMENT
Threat modeling Implement a threat and target analysis of a computer network defense (CND) information and production
of threat information within an enterprise.
Asset evaluation Track and classify the status of protected information assets within a company.
Mitigation Perform an information security risk assessment and write a plan for security countermeasures to mitigate
identified risks within a corporation.
Vulnerability Perform vulnerability assessments of relevant technology focus areas for a government agency.
CONSTRAINTS
Legal Transform applicable laws, statutes, and regulatory documents into one integrated policy for a government
agency.
Ethical Modify existing ethical codes of conduct for a company.
Organizational Explain an enterprise system security context, a preliminary system security concept of operations, and
present baseline system security requirements in accordance with applicable security requirements.
Privacy Incorporate privacy requirements in organization’s security policy.
Political Describe to a group of peers the different sensibilities of all stakeholders concerning an organization’s
security policy.
CONTROLS
Administrative Design and document a systems administration security operating procedure for a small organization.
Physical Classify security requirements specific to a security environment for an organization to maintain a critical
systems lifecycle.
Technical Oversee and make recommendations regarding configuration management of a governmental unit.
Table 8: Snapshot of Model 2
Domain L1 L2 L3 L4
GOVERNANCE
Policy . . . . . . . . .
Strategy . . .
Compliance . . . . . . . . .
Standardization . . . . . . . . .
RISK MANAGEMENT
Threat modeling . . . . . . . . . . . .
Asset evaluation . . . . . . . . .
Mitigation . . . . . . . . .
Vulnerability . . . . . . . . .
CONSTRAINTS
Legal . . . . . .
Ethical . . . . . . . . .
Organizational . . . . . .
Privacy . . . . . .
Political . . .
CONTROLS
Administrative . . . . . . . . . . . .
Physical . . . . . . . . . . . .
Technical . . . . . . . . . . . .
fragility of global information technology infrastructure. Cyberse-
curity must be part of a mainstream in higher education and not
relegated to the corner of boutique programs. The cost to society of
not having the capacity to meet emerging cybersecurity challenges
is simply too high.
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